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ATTITUDES ABOUT ATTITUDES
Michael J. Gerhardt*
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED.
By Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni
versity Press. 2002. Pp. xix, 459. Paper, $25.

INTRODUCTION
Attitudes about the Supreme Court differ sharply, particularly
among academics. Law professors believe the Constitution and other
laws constrain the Court, while most political scientists do not. These
different perspectives on justices' fidelity to the law1 ensure that legal
scholars and political scientists have little to say about the Court that
is of interest to each other.
As a result, it should not be surprising that most legal scholars are
unfamiliar with Harold Spaeth2 and Jeffrey Segal,3 the two political
scientists most closely associated with the view that the law does not
constrain the justices from voting their policy preferences. Building on
social psychology research and theory, Spaeth initially constructed and
Segal later joined in refining the so-called attitudinal model. In several
publications including a classic book published in 1993,4 Spaeth and
Segal ("the authors") explain and demonstrate the empirical support
for their model as holding that justices decide cases on the basis of
their personal attitudes about social policy and not on the basis of any
genuine fidelity to law. In 1999, the authors empirically demonstrated
that precedent did not constrain the justices from voting their policy

* Arthur B. Hanson Professor, William & Mary Law School. B.A. 1978, Yale; M.Sc.
1979, London School of Economics; J.D. 1982, University of Chicago. - Ed. Thanks to
Barry Friedman, Mark Graber, Ron Kahn, and the participants in a William & Mary Law
School workshop for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

1. See generally Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251, 280-84 (1997) (contrasting
the "internal" and "external" perspectives on the law).
2. Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University.
3. Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Stony Brook.
4. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
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preferences.5 This and other research have made the authors lighten
ing rods among political scientists who study the Court.
Spurred by their zealous commitment to the attitudinal model and
their notoriety among political scientists, the authors revised their
classic work to update its empirical foundation and to respond to their
critics. The revised work constitutes their most extensive challenge yet
to skeptics of the attitudinal model.
In this Review, I assess the renewed claim about the attitudinal
model's superiority in explaining and predicting the Court's decisions.
After reviewing the book's basic arguments in Part I, I examine in Part
II the critique of competing models. The major problem with this
critique is its failure to appraise other models in their strongest forms.
The authors insist other models satisfy the rigid criteria for scientific
inquiry - i.e., they should posit falsifiable propositions - even
though each is supported by other, common social-science research
strategies.
Part III examines the attitudinal model's major limitations. First,
it vainly seeks to objectify and quantify inherently subjective data.
Second, it cannot explain short- or long-term change in constitutional
law. It assumes mistakenly that all justices have fixed preferences
when first appointed and that the categories for demarcating ideolo
gies are constant.
Part IV suggests future research to perfect the attitudinal model.
These suggestions include tracking extensively the connection be
tween justices' backgrounds and decisions; assessing the implications
of the Court's judgments configured as standards or rules, which help
to explain their unpredictability; and tracing the patterns of decisions
and precedent's functions in constitutional adjudication. Researching
these questions is likely to support greater coordination of competing
models of the Court. A synthetic model conceivably holds the greatest
promise of comprehensively explaining the Court's decisions.
I.

REVISITING THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL

The authors' new book significantly revises and updates two
themes explored in their earlier research. The first theme is the failure
of non-attitudinal models to explain and predict the Supreme Court's
decisions. In earlier works, the authors posited a simplistic version of
the legal model as mechanically controlling legal interpretation and
permitting no indeterminacy.6 In their revised book, they analyze the
legal model as "the belief that, in one form or another, the decisions of
'
the Court are substantially influenced by the facts of the case in light

5. See HAROLD J. SPAETH & J EFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY
WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999).
6. See. e.g., id.

at 8-9.
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of the plain meaning of statutes and the Constitution, the intent of the
framers, and/or precedent" (p. 48; citation omitted). Their analysis
includes critiquing Ronald Dworkin's view that "stare decisis plays a
vital role in judicial decision-making. "7 Dworkin argues the quest to
find a fit between past cases and a "hard" one in which no preexisting
rule of law exists leads judges to "eliminate interpretations that some
judges would otherwise prefer, so that the brute facts of legal history
will in this way limit the role any judge's personal concoctions can play
in his decisions."8 The authors suggest, however, that Dworkin's (and
others') conception of the law fails to meet the exacting standards of
scientific research, because it is not �'falsifiable. . . . [T]he model must
be able to state a priori the potential conditions that, if observed,
would refute the model" (p. 46). Because the legal model posits no
such conditions, it is irrefutable.
Drawing on prior research, the authors consider:
[T]he best evidence for the influence of precedent must come from Uus
tices who dissented] from the majority opinion . . . under question, for we
know that these justices disagree with the precedent. If the precedent es
tablished in the case influences them, that influence should be felt in that
case's progeny, through their votes and opinion writing. Thus, determin
ing the influence of precedent requires examining the extent to which
justices who disagree with a precedent move toward that position in sub
sequent cases. (p. 292)
The authors searched 2418 votes and cases for evidence of the "gravi
tational force" of precedent that they believe is claimed by Dworkin,9
the " 'respect for precedent' " Ronald Kahn claims justices exhibit,10
or the validity of Herman Pritchett's "statement that " '[j]udges make
choices, but they are not the 'free' choices of congressmen.' "11 In
categorizing attitudes towards precedent, the authors treated justices
who supported challenged precedents as "precedentialists" (ranging
from strong to weak) and justices who did not as "preferentialists"
(ranging from strong to weak) (p. 296). They further broke down cases
into "ordinary" and "landmark" cases as rated by Congressional
Quarterly's Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court (p. 295). Their data
showed that "[t]he justices are rarely influenced by stare decisis" (p.
7. P. 50 (discussing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE] ) .
8. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 7, at 255.
9. Id. at 401.
10. P. 288 (quoting Ronald Kahn, Interpretive Norms and Supreme Court Decision
Making: The Rehnquist Court on Privacy and Religion, in SUPREME COURT DECISION
MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 175 (Cornell
man eds., 1999)).

w. Clayton & Howard Gill

11. P. 298 (quoting C. Herman Pritchett, The Development of Judicial Research, in
FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 42 (Grossman & Tanenhaus eds., 1969) (alteration in
original)).
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298). It demonstrated "beyond doubt . . . that the modern Supreme
Courts, heavily criticized for their activism, did not invent or even
perfect preferential behavior; it has been with us since Washington
packed the Court with Federalists" (p. 300). The few precedentialist
acts are irrelevant because they are
more likely to be found in cases of the lowest salience: ordinary cases
compared with landmark cases and, among ordinary cases, statutory
cases over constitutional cases and modern economic cases over modern
civil liberties cases. The influence of precedent appears to be quite mi
nor, but it does not appear to be completely idiosyncratic. (p. 306)
Indeed, "not one justice of the Rehnquist Court exercised deference
to precedent by voting to uphold both conservative and liberal prece
dents" (p. 310).
A second model derives from rational-choice theory, which the
authors did not address in their earlier book. They identify "two
camps" of rational-choice theorists who study the Court (p. 100). The
first is "an internal camp that focuses on the interactions among the
justices" to facilitate or achieve the maximization of their collective
satisfaction (p. 100).
Equilibria . . . are crucial to most rational choice theorists. They repre
sent "a prediction, for a prespecified circumstance, about the choices of
people and the corresponding outcomes. This prediction generally takes
the form of 'if the institutional context of a choice is . . . and if people's
preferences are . . . then the only choices and outcomes that can endure
are . . . . ' " (pp. 99-100; citation omitted, ellipsis in original)
Thus, equilibrium theory "provid[es] necessary and sufficient condi
tions for choices to occur" (p. 100). The authors acknowledge other
theorists - principally Lee Epstein and Jack Knight - who "dispute
the centrality of equilibrium analysis for rational-choice models,
labeling the positions taken by each side of the debate a play 'to its
competitive advantage' " (p. 100; internal citation omitted). Never
theless, the authors consider equilibrium theory as the "most powerful
tool and is clearly the comparative advantage that rational-choice the
ory has over other theories" (p. 100) because it provides the means by
which to construct falsifiable models of strategic behavior by "demon
strat[ing] that interactions among the justices constitute a best
response to a best response, or alternative equilibrium solutions" (p.
102). Rational-choice theorists mistakenly infer strategies from the
outcomes achieved in particular cases, even though this is circular; and
they "allow uustices to pursue] any goals whatsoever," making every
objective achieved rational (p. 111).
The second camp of rational-choice theorists focuses on con
straints imposed on the Court by political actors. These theorists favor
separation-of-powers models, which "examine the degree to which the
courts must defer to legislative majorities in order to prevent overrides
that result in policy worse than what the court might have achieved
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through more sophisticated behavior" (p. 103). In the authors' judg
ment, the best of these works is Brian Marks's study of a statutory
case in which "the justices simply voted their ideal points."12 Other
separation-of-powers models are undermined by flawed assumptions,
including "that the Court will construe legislation as close to its ideal
point as possible without getting overturned by Congress" (p. 105);
"the justices have perfect and complete information about the prefer
ences of Congress" (p. 106); disallowing "the Court from bundling
issues" (p. 107); treating legislation overturning decisions "as costless"
(p. 107); and "always giv[ing] Congress the final move" (p. 108). The
most serious problem with these models is their uniform treatment of
"judicial preferences as if they were exogenously determined" (p.
109).

The final model rejected by the authors is postpositivism, sometimes called the new institutionalism. This model
make claims, not about the predictable behavior of judges, but about
their state of mind - whether they are basing their decisions on honest
judgments about the meaning of law. What is post-positivist about this
version is the assumption that a legal state of mind does not necessarily
mean obedience to conspicuous rules; instead, it means a sense of obliga
tion to make the best decision possible in light of one's general training
and sense of professional obligation. On this view, decisions are consid
ered legally motivated if they represent a judge's sincere belief that their
decision represents their best understanding of what the law re
quires . . . . "[J]udging in good faith" is all we can expect of judges.13
Postpositivists reject the need to construct a falsifiable model based on
their belief "that doing [empirical] tests has the effect of changing the
concept of 'legal influence' so that it no longer represents what they
believe"14 are significant errors. Nevertheless, "virtually any decision
can be consistent with the legal model. And any decision is consistent
with the model as long as the judge has sincerely convinced him- or
herself that the decision is legally appropriate" (pp. 432-33). The post
positivist model also "fails to appreciate the fundamental influence of
motivated reasoning in human decision making" (p. 433), i.e., it fails to
recognize people invariably convince themselves of the rationality of
what they are doing.

12. P. 104 (quoting BRIAN A. MARKS, A MODEL OF JUDICIAL INFLUENCE ON
CONGRESSIONAL POLICYMAKING: GROVE CITY COLLEGE v. BELL 88-7 (Hoover Institu
tion, Stanford University, Working Papers in Political Science No. P-88-7, 1981 )).
13. P. 432 (quoting Howard Gillman, What's Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behav
iora/ists Test the "Legal Model" of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 465,
486 (2001) (internal citations omitted)); see also p. 48 n.12 ("To post-positive legalists, the
only required influence of law is a subjective influence that resides within the justice's own
mind.").
14. P. 433 n.8 (quoting Gillman, supra note 13, at 485).
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The second theme of the book is the claim that the attitudinal
model best explains and predicts Supreme Court decisions. The
authors describe the "the ideological considerations that have moti
vated the thrust of the Court's decisions since its inception" (p. xvi).
They also proclaim Bush v. Gore15 as proof for their model, for "one
may accurately say that never in its history has a majority of the Court
behaved in such a blatantly politically partisan fashion" (p. 171). The
decision stands out because the majority upheld for the first time an
equal protection claim without any "showing [of] purposeful intent to
discriminate" (p. 172). The majority "produc[ed] an arrogantly anti
states' rights decision" in spite of its frequently professed concerns for
state sovereignty (p. 174). Its transparency is further evident in eight
cases over a four-and-a-half-year period in which a bare majority of
the Rehnquist Court struck down federal laws for violating state
sovereignty in spite of the decisions' complete detachment from con
stitutional text, history, and precedent.16 The authors believe the only
explanation for these decisions is the majority's preferences to "for
malistically redefin[e] federal-state relationships" in order to curtail
congressional efforts to implement social policies with which the
justices disagree and to preserve certain power relationships within the
states (p. 174).
The authors further claim that "[o]nly the attitudinal model's
explanation [of Court decisions] is well supported by systematic
empirical evidence" (p. 351). Throughout the book, they draw on the
extraordinary database that they have assembled on the justices'
backgrounds, nominating presidents, supporting and opposing sena
tors, and the procedural histories and outcomes of the Court's
decisions. Thus, their aggregate analysis of data on Supreme Court
nominations and confirmations leads to their finding that:
[A] nominee's reception [in the Senate] hinges on the characteristics of
the nominee and the composition of the Senate. So, too, the context of a
nomination strongly influences the outcome. The strength and popularity
of the President emerge as important determinants of individual votes. In
addition, the relative mobilization of interest groups around a nominee
also has pronounced effects. (p. 222)
Based on reversal and prediction strategies of the justices' voting on
certiorari petitions, the authors found that:

15. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
16. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706 (1 999); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666 (1 999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1 997); Idaho v. Coeur d'Arlene Tribe, 521
U.S. 261 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995).
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The link that connects the various factors that determine who gets into
the Supreme Court are the individual justices' personal policy goals.
Given the freedom to select for review such cases as they wish, the fac
tors that govern selection and the strategies that the various justices em
ploy in voting to review a case are matters of individual determination.
(p. 276)
Based on their careful coding and tracking of the justices' votes in
landmark and ordinary cases, they found " 'crisis' stare decisis"
in which "the decision to overturn precedent is conditioned on the
ideological direction of the precedent being overturned" (p. 311).
Based on bivariant and multivariant analyses of coalition formation
and opinion assignments, they determined "justices are capable of
engaging in sophisticated behavior in arenas [such as voting on certio
rari] where sophisticated voting clearly makes sense" (p. 350).
Unlike the decision on the merits, coalition formation takes place in an
inherently interactive environment, as both attitudinal and rational
choice based works have demonstrated. Nevertheless, the sincere prefer
ences of the justices go a long way toward explaining their decisions [to
write separately or join others' opinions], while interactive factors such
as influence do not. (p. 404; footnotes omitted)
Indeed, "influence," or the ability of other justices to persuade others
to join their opinions, "seems to be a function of like-mindedness" (p.
404). Nor did the authors find any evidence indicating that public
opinion influences decisions. Moreover, the aggregated votes of indi
vidual justices on the Rehnquist Court indicate that, "[o]utside of sup
port for the Solicitor General (including agency cases), [concerns
about judicial restraint] are either imperceptible or explained by the
justices substantive policy preferences" (p. 428).
Near the end of their book, the authors propose future research on
the Court, including determining whether the "sequential process
of certiorari voting lead[s] to a signaling game," the extent of the
opinion-writer's influence in shaping outcomes, the extent to which
lower courts "tailor[] [their] preferences to the Court median" in spite
of an arguably controlling Supreme Court precedent written "off the
median," the extent of median justices' influence in shaping the
reasoning or outcomes of Court decisions, and whether "the structural
features of the American political system [can] lead to a compelling
formal model of rationally sincere behavior on the merits for the
justices, even in statutory cases" (pp. 434-35).
II. THE LIMITS OF THE ATIITUDINAL CRITIQUE
This Part assesses the authors' critique of other models of the
Supreme Court. If the critique fails, the attitudinal model can no
longer claim exclusive capacity to explain and predict judicial deci
sions.
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The Legal Model

The major problem with the critique of the legal model is no such
legal model exists. The authors' description of the legal model does
not correspond to legal scholars' conception of law. They have never
purported to construct a formal model of legal reasoning, much less a
scientific one. The authors concede as much when they chastise legal
scholars for refusing to construct a model akin to that which scientists
employ.
This refusal is common among social scientists. In fact,
legal scholarship frequently pursues doctrinal, interpretive, and norma
tive purposes rather than empirical ones. Legal scholars often are just
playing a different game than the empiricists play, which means that no
amount of insistence on the empiricists' rules can indict legal scholarship
- any more than strict adherence to the rules of baseball supports an in
dictment of cricket.17
Other fields, such as presidential studies, employ similar methods.18
Moreover, the authors' "empirical methodology blinds them to legal
scholarship's internal perspective" or legal scholars' efforts to explain
the process by which judges and justices "interpret" the law.19 The
internal perspective includes methods for criticizing the coherence of
different interpretative methodologies. The authors ignore, however,
arguments over methodology. They fail to appreciate how legal schol
ars and judges critique alternative interpretive approaches based on
their internal coherence and achievement of their stated objectives.
Thus, Dworkin's account of legal reasoning is evaluated on how
it makes sense of data on judging and compares with alternative
explanations.20

17. Jack Goldsmith & Adrien Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 153-54 (2002).
18. For a sampling of works in presidential studies relying on doctrinal, interpretive, and
normative analyses rather than empirical analysis, see FRED I. GREENSTEIN, THE
PRESIDENTIAL DIFFERENCE: LEADERSHIP STYLE FROM FDR TO CLINTON 5 (2000) (fo
cusing on "the leadership qualities of each of the presidents from FDR to Bill Clinton and
their significance for the public and the political community"); SIDNEY M. MILKIS &
MICHAEL NELSON, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: ORIGINS AND D EVELOPMENT 1 776-1 998
(3d ed. 1999) (offering interpretive political history of the presidency); and STEPHEN
SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO
GEORGE BUSH (1993) (assessing presidents as agents of political change by tracing the "in
tercurrence of the basic types of political leadership with expansion and diversification of the
institutional universe of presidential action"). See also PRESIDENTIAL POWER: FORGING
THE PRESIDENCY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Robert Y. Shapiro et al. eds., 2000)
(commentaries on the methodologies employed in studying the presidency from Richard
Neustadt's classic work in the field to recent scholarship).
19. Goldsmith & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 154.
20. See, e.g., p. 298 (suggesting that "[t]he levels of precedential behavior that we find in
the U.S. Supreme Court are simply not consistent with the sort of arguments we find, for
example, in Dworkin, Kahn, or any of the other legalists that we have discussed"). For a
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The authors' external perspective leads them to distort the law
repeatedly. For instance, variations in judicial votes might not be evi
dence of hypocrisy but rather demonstrate that "what they call 'sub
jective preferences' may be nothing more than honest attempts to
apply consistent interpretive philosophy to the facts. "21 They also
discount the fact that the Court decides hard cases. "Virtually none of
the disputes that reach the Court are easy cases. Most of them concern
issues for which sources of legal authority - constitutional text, origi
nal understanding, evolving tradition, precedent - do not yield
determinate answers. "22 The Court's docket consists of cases in which
no source points to a simple or obvious answer. In the close cases that
get to the Court, ideology arguably plays a significant role in shaping
the justices' attitudes towards, or manipulation of, legal materials. Yet,
the pertinent ideology is not the same as partisan attitudes. It is judi
cial ideology, which entails a perspective on federal judges' role in the
constitutional order.23 The authors never systematically track or
examine the significance of such ideology.
Four other examples further illustrate the authors' distortions. The
first is their insistence that Bush v. Gore constitutes "the most egre
gious example of judicial policy making" ever (p. 2). Curiously, they
fail to acknowledge that many legal scholars would agree. Even so, the
claim is dubious, because seven justices - including Clinton appointee
Stephen Breyer - upheld Bush's equal protection claim and conse
quently agreed to reverse the Florida Supreme Court's ruling that
preserved Vice-President Gore's challenge to Florida Secretary of
State Kathleen Harris's certification of the Florida election in Bush's
favor. This was a bipartisan coalition of justices who supported Bush's
claim. Nor do the authors acknowledge the implications of the Florida
Supreme Court's failure to take advantage of an available basis in the
law upon which to insulate its judgment from Supreme Court review, a
failure that prompted a unanimous decision by the Court24 that pro
vided the state supreme court with the chance to clarify an "independ-

commentary on how best to evaluate Dworkin's scholarship, see Edward J. McCaffery ,
Ronald Dworkin, Inside-Out, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1043 (1 997).
21. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, 4 LAW & Crs.
6, 7 (1994).
22. Vincent Blasi, Praise for the Court's Unpredictability, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1986, at
A23.
23. See generally Should Ideology Matter?: Judicial Nominations 2001: Hearing Before
the Senate Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judi
ciary, 107th Cong. App. (2001) (special hearing explaining the relevance of ideology to judi
cial selection).
24. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).

.
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ent and adequate" basis for its initial judgment in Florida election
law.25
Moreover, the authors' claim that the majority's ruling contra
dicted their usual preference to rule in favor of state sovereignty
demonstrates a lack of understanding of the implications of the
Court's ruling. The seven-member majority voted to leave the final
word on the outcome of the Florida election not to federal judges but
rather to the state's political authorities. The ultimate winners in the
case were not the justices (in fortifying the scope of federal judicial
review over state-court judgments) but rather the state political
authorities in managing Gore's challenge.26
Second, the authors distort the Court's decision striking down
the Line Item Veto Act.27 They suggest that the argument that the
Constitution does not define "bill" and otherwise says nothing about
what the President may veto should have controlled the case. The
strongest argument for supporting the act, however, was that it satis
fied the nondelegation doctrine,28 i.e., Congress furnished "intelligible
principles" that the President was bound to follow. The question in the
case was whether Congress could delegate to the President limited
authority to cancel specific appropriations measures, not whether he
had inherent authority to do so.
The authors also fail to acknowledge the significance of the
dissent. They mention the vote was six to three, but they neglect to
mention that Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and
Stephen Breyer were the dissenters.29 There is no obvious ideological
common ground among these justices. They dissented, not because of
constitutional silence or failure to define "bill," but rather because of
their agreement that the statute satisfied the Constitution's nondelega
tion doctrine.

25. For example, in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983), the Court
explained that "when . . . a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal
law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of
any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the
most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it
believed that federal law required it to do so. "
26. The authors refer mistakenly to three justices "overrul[ing]" the Florida Supreme
Court. P. 1. They are referring to the Chief Justice's separate concurrence, joined by two
other justices. Six justices refused to join this concurrence and thus endorse its peculiar con
struction of Article II as vesting state legislatures with exclusive authority to determine the
procedures for presidential elections.
27. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 4 17 (1998).
28. See A. L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1 935).
29. See p. 1 70; Clinton, 524 U.S. at 484-90 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by O'Connor, J.,
and Scalia, J.) (arguing that the act satisfied the nondelegation doctrine).
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Third, the authors ignore legal justifications for many other cases.30
The authors exclude unanimous opinions from their data set on the
justices' fidelity to precedent because these opinions lack the friction
that presumably provides the impetus for justices to express their
respective policy preferences.31 Unanimity is hard, however, to square
with a critique of the legal model that suggests the justices never, or
almost never, make decisions based on legal variables. Even worse for
the critique of the legal model is that many unanimous and nearly
unanimous opinions involve salient issues on which the justices tran
scend their ideological differences to reach agreement about the law.32
Fourth, there are problems with the authors' claim that there is
no "better example of judicial doublespeak" (p. 11) than Printz v.
United States33 in which the Court struck down the Brady Handgun
Prevention Act's requirement that local authorities conduct back
ground checks on prospective handgun purchasers. The authors mis
takenly assert the Court struck down the entire act; it did not. It spe
cifically overruled the provision mandating local officials to implement
federal policy. The Court's decision arose from the "structure of the
Constitution,"34 which the authors regard as completely detached from
the text, and as mere subterfuge allowing the majority to obfuscate its
real intent. The idea that drawing inferences from the structure is
"doublespeak" is astounding. Structural design is, as Charles Black
suggested, arguably the most significant source of constitutional
meaning, and one whose legitimacy has been recognized by every

30. Every case that is explicable on the basis of some legal variable is inconsistent with
the attitudinal model. See, e.g., infra note 32 and accompanying text.
31. Seep. 295 ("We exclude . . . unanimously decided cases. Only dissenters can be con
flicted between their stated preferences and the precedent the majority established in that
case.").
32. See, e.g., Eldred v. Aschroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (upholding, seven to two, Con
gress's repeated extensions of the rights of copyright ownership in spite of constitutional
language allowing Congress to do so for "limited terms"); Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141
(2000) (unanimously upholding Congress's power to bar states from disclosing or selling per
sonal information required for drivers' licenses); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (reinvig
orating, seven to two, the Privileges or Immunities clause); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681
(1997) (unanimously holding that sitting presidents are not entitled to any immunity from
civil lawsuits based on their unofficial misconduct); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515
(1996) (ruling seven to one Virginia Military Academy's policy of excluding women as stu
dents violated equal protection); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (unanimously
agreeing that the Court lacked the power to review the constitutionality of the procedures
employed by the Senate in judicial impeachment trials); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
(1988) (upholding the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Act eight to one);
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (unanimously holding presidents not entitled to
an absolute executive privilege that would have allowed them unilateral discretion over
whether to comply with otherwise lawful subpoenas).
33. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
34. Printz, 521 U.S. at 918-25.

1744

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:1733

justice, regardless of ideological preference.35 Indeed, the concept of
separation of powers to which the authors frequently refer is an infer
ence from it.36 There is nothing principled about a critique that rejects
an inference as a contrivance but then employs it when it suits the
critics' purposes.37
The authors' dismissal of the "structure of the Constitution" as
socialized contrivance is unfair. They presume that socialization has
blinded the justices to accept clearly correct answers to constitutional
questions, though they never stitch a coherent methodology together.
The authors' claim also lacks any empirical support - it violates the
rules of inference, which, as the next Section shows, some scholars
insist is indispensable for empirical research in social science.
B.

The Rational-Choice Model

There are many problems with the authors' critique of rational
choice models. First, their critique is not directed at arguably the most
significant work done on the Court by rational choice theorists. The
authors suggest that "the most prominent of the recent rational choice
works on the Supreme Court" are problematic because they do not at
tempt, or fail when they do attempt, to measure equilibrium predic
tions (p. 102). Yet, they also mention that Lee Epstein and Jack
Knight dispute "the centrality of equilibrium analysis for rational
choice models" (p. 100). The authors never explain why they "agree
with Epstein and Knight that equilibrium analysis is not the only way
to 'do' rational choice theory" (p. 100). The sparse discussion of
Epstein and Knight is likely to leave readers with the false impression
that Epstein and Knight's work is insignificant. Yet, Epstein's scholar·
ship on her own, with Knight, and with others, are probably the best
known among rational-choice models of the Court. Her major thesis is
that the justices are not completely free to vote their policy prefer
ences but rather operate within a specific institutional environment
that sometimes constrains the justices to take various factors into con35. See CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1969).
36. See, e.g., pp. 18-20, 22, 43, 231.
37. The authors further condemn the majority opinion for rejecting practices
dating back to the first Congress.... As Federalist 27 argues, "The legislatures, courts, and
magistrates, of the respective members, will be incorporated into the operations of the na
tional government as far as its just and constitutional authority extends; and will be rendered
auxiliary to the enforcement of its law." While The Federalist is not fundamental law, we are
aware of no Supreme Court decision that more directly contradicts an explicit statement
from the Papers.
P. 174;

internal citation omitted.
The authors do not acknowledge that the majority cited the passage but did not find it
determinative because it failed to address the question before the Court - whether the
handgun law exceeded Congress's "constitutional authority."
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sideration, such as the norm of stare decisis, when formulating strate
gies to implement their objectives.38
The clash between the attitudinal model and Epstein and Knight's
work is most apparent in the authors' discussion of the extent to which
precedent genuinely constrains the justices from voting their policy
preferences. In an earlier article, Epstein and Knight argued that
"precedent can serve as a constraint on justices acting on their per
sonal policy preferences."39 Although judges and justices might prefer
to ignore precedent in favor of their preferred policies, they are con
strained by the utility of precedent in fostering social stability and ju
dicial legitimacy. Others might react negatively if the Court violated
precedent. In support of the significance of precedent in judicial
decisionmaking, Epstein and Knight pointed to the ubiquity of cita
tions to precedent in published judicial opinions as well as in the
arguments of litigants and the private discussions of the justices them
selves. The authors responded that ubiquity was not influence.
Moreover, they claimed the evidence, on which Epstein and Knight
relied, actually demonstrated that the justices felt little social pressure
to adhere to precedents.40 The authors' quarrel is less with Epstein and
Knight's empirical methods than with the implications of their data.
Moreover, they cite, but do not discuss, other work consistent with
Epstein's approach, demonstrating, for example, that standing doc
trine is the culmination of the justices' strategic decision making to
create some barriers on the abilities of ideological plaintiffs to
manipulate the Court's docket.41
Moreover, a crucial dimension of Epstein's and others' rational
choice models is their agreement with Ferejohn and Weingast's insight
that "there is no 'last word' in politics."42 This dynamic ensures there is
no point of equilibrium attainable in the political process. At best, the
justices never cease to try to gain some competitive advantage over
the other branches until the wheel turns and the power relationship
among them alters.
The second, related difficulty is that Epstein has been as critical as
the authors with respect to legal scholars' methodological laxity. For
38. See, e.g. , LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICE JUSTICES MAKE (1998). For
some perspective, see FOREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAw ON THE SUPREME
COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000), which examines the ways in which intracourt bar
gaining affects the opinion-writing process.
39. Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018,
1021 (1996).
40. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Norms, Dragons, and Stare Decisis: A Re
sponse, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1064-82 (1996).

41. P. 435 (citing MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL
CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (2000)).
42. P. 108 (quoting John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statu
tory Interpretation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 263, 263 (1992)).
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instance, she and Gary King argued that legal scholars generally fail to
follow the rules used in natural and social science for drawing infer
ences from empirical research.43 They insisted, inter alia, that legal
scholars need to draw and define data properly and provide guidance
for drawing conclusions from the data and hypotheses tested. Epstein
and King cautioned against drawing broad inferences from limited
data. They objected that legal research often contains "stridently
stated, but overly confident, conclusions"44 that go well beyond what
the research will support. They cautioned legal scholars further not to
be "definitive,"45 but "rather to estimate the degree of uncertainty
inherent in each conclusion and to report this estimate along with
every conclusion" to be the degree of uncertainty inherent in their
conclusions.46
Epstein and King's critique of legal scholars' empirical ignorance
can, however, be turned against the attitudinal model.47 The authors
suggest the Court's activism in striking down a historic number of fed
eral laws within the past five years shows the justices' willingness to
substitute their judgment for that of Congress, but the authors draw
the wrong inference. None of these cases, with the possible exception
of United States v. Morrison,48 involved salient issues likely to provoke
congressional retaliation. In these cases, the Court only struck down
specific provisions within the laws they reviewed that extended their
reach to the states. Congress was rarely faced with having to reenact
these statutes in full. The application of these laws to the states is not a
salient issue for Congress because most Americans do not appear to
care about the implications of Congress's inability to subject the states
to various regulatory schemes.
Moreover, the authors draw the wrong inferences from their data
on legal reasoning. At most, the data show a consistency between out
comes and justices' policy preferences, but the only plausible inference
to draw from these data is that it does not rule out the possibility that
justices decide some cases consistent with their ideological prefer
ences. The data do not show legal variables are not factors in the jus
tices' decisions.
The third problem is that the authors often agree with rational
choice theory's insights. The agreement is hard to square with their

43. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002).
44. Id. at 7.
45. Id. at 52.
46. Id. at 50.
47. See, e.g., Frank Cross et al., Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein and King, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 35 (2002).
48. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (overturning the civil remedies provision of the Violence
Against Women Act).
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repeated dismissal of the utility of rational-choice theory. Yet, they
agreed that "justices are capable of engaging in sophisticated behavior
in arenas where sophisticated voting clearly makes sense" such as in
certiorari voting (p. 350). They further conceded that they do not
say that the Supreme Court never engages in sophisticated behavior on
the merits. Rather, given the difficulty of passing legislation in Congress,
given the Supreme Court's rather incomplete information about congres
sional preferences, the salience of Court decisions to members of Con
gress, and the short-lived duration of whatever Congress the Court is
facing, we argue that the Court virtually never defers to presumed con
gressional preferences in the first instance. Rather, the justices will rou
tinely vote their sincere preferences. If and when Congress ever mounts a
clear and imminent threat to the Court's institutional policy-making
powers, then and only then will the Court respond and back down. But
given the extraordinary difficulty of striking at the Court's powers, such
times will be rare, indeed. (p. 350 n.102)
The authors claim the justices will do whatever the system allows them
to do, but this claim is consistent with a rational-choice conception of
justices as trying to do just that.
Fourth, rational-choice theorists have defined some critically
important variables problematically. For instance, Epstein and King
have suggested that an appropriate proxy for measuring a judge's
ideology is the ideologies of sponsoring senators.49 As Dean Richard
Revesz has shown, this proxy is flawed, because district court appoint
ees have sponsoring senators, while nominees to appellate judgeships
tend only occasionally to have sponsors and those appointed in the
District of Columbia rarely do.50 Supreme Court nominees are even
less likely than appellate judges to owe their appointments to a single
senator.
An even bigger problem with the authors' critique of rational
choice models is its inability to explain data that can be explained on
the basis of the postpositivist model of the Court. Thus, a closer look
at the authors' critique of this other model is in order.
C. Postpositivism
The major problem with the authors' critique of postpositivism is
that they do not analyze it in its strongest form. For example, they fail
to acknowledge that postpositivists have ample empirical data to
support their conception of judges as trying to "make the best decision
possible in light of [their) training and sense of professional obliga-

49. Epstein & King, supra note 43, at 83-84.
50. Richard L. Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
169, 180-83 (2002).
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tion. "51 The critical assumption of institutionalists like the postpositiv
ists is that understanding the judicial process requires appreciating the
implications of the specific institutional context within which justices
operate. Fundamental to this project is accepting that this context has
substantive effects, while attitudinalists and rational-choice theorists
believe it largely - if not wholly - operates as a cipher.
Postpositivists have amassed an impressive amount of empirical
support for their claim that structure shapes judicial decisionmaking.
Though not strictly falsifiable, the evidence can be assessed on the
bases of logic, experience, and history. Howard Gillman amply
summarizes it.52 This research poses a problem for the critique of the
postpositivist model because, as Gillman explains, it has "[a]ll [been]
written by scholars who were mindful of the debates in the literature
about legal versus personal influences on decision making, and all
attempted to show how the judges' expressed beliefs and patterns of
behavior could only be explained with reference to distinctive legal
norms. "53 The authors have yet to make a rejoinder to this copious
research except to dismiss it as not being falsifiable and as not allow
ing for the likelihood that justices will simply use whatever reasoning
they can muster to support the outcomes they prefer. The rejoinder
falls flat because the massive evidence supporting postpositivism flatly
contradicts the attitudinal model on perfectly reasonable grounds.54
III. THE LIMITS OF THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
The bulk of the authors' revised treatise sets forth the data
supporting the attitudinal model. The data fail, however, to support
the attitudinal model nearly as much as the authors think. There are
three significant problems with the model's empirical support, each of
which I discuss below.

51.

P.

432 (quoting Gillman, supra note 13, at 486).

52. Gillman describes research on the Court's due process and commerce clause deci
sions from the late nineteenth century to the New Deal era, the Warren Court's failure to
constitutionalize welfare rights, the developments of modern free speech and death penalty
jurisprudence, and the certiorari process. Gillman, supra note 13, at 490-91 .
53. Id. at 491.
54. See id. at 492:
the major difference [between the empirical work of postpositivists and Spaeth and Segal's]
seems to be that Spaeth and Segal create what some legalists would consider a fairly artificial
standard for what should count as a legal frame of mind (gravitate toward precedents from
which you dissented) while these other scholars made it a focused object of their research to
understand and reconstruct the actual legal standards under which these judges were oper
ating.

May 2003]

Attitudes About Attitudes
A.

1749

Empirical Dilemmas

The major problem with the attitudinal model's empirical support
is the authors' objectification of subjective preferences and phenom
ena. While there are clearly some objective facts in constitutional law
(for example, the constitutional text, the winners and losers of law
suits, and the justices' and their nominating presidents' respective par
ties) many other factors are subjective, including the characterization
of a justice's interpretive methodology or ideology. Reducing these to
quantifiable terms, much less to the rigors of scientific measurement,
is futile. Richard Posner (to whose critique of legal reasoning they
defer55) has condemned empirical analysis of the sort employed by the
authors as "soft" and unlike the methods of a "hard" field such as
physics in which theorists reason to "divergent conclusions from
shared premises. "56 The authors search in vain for such premises.
Ironically, legal scholars' lack of consensus on explanations for the
Court's decisions or criteria for evaluating them is more of a problem
for the authors than legal scholars.
The quest to objectify subjective preferences stumbles at almost
every turn. For instance, one problem with the authors' original work
was the circularity of their research - they had determined justices'
attitudes by their votes and then explained their votes by their atti
tudes. To get around this problem, the authors measure judicial atti
tudes by four major newspapers' editorials at the times of their ap
pointments and through the justices' earlier votes that are validated
through the predictions of later votes (p. 321). Instead of relying on
the Court's opinions for the facts of a case, they obtain them from
lower-court records.
The external sources the authors have found to validate justices'
ideologies are themselves problematic. First, it is unclear why newspa
per editorials should be taken as neutral on this matter. It is possible
(and many people believe) newspapers have ideological agendas,
which will influence their analyses of the justices. Second, the authors'
objective should not just be to find an external source for defining a
justice's ideology but to find an external source on whose authority
most experts can agree. If there are no experts or they cannot agree on
a source, the futility of the research is all the more apparent. Third,
the reliance on the past votes of lower-court judges is problematic
because many Supreme Court nominees have never served, or served
only briefly, as lower-court judges.57 The authors offer no substitute
55. Seepp. 85, 93.
56. RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION,
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON 240 (1999).
57. Seep. 182 ("93 of the 147 nominees (63 percent) [to the Court] have occupied judi
cial positions" prior to their appointments.).
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for measuring these justices' ideology. Fourth, the authors do not
account for the fact that state and federal judges have had different
caseloads and exposures to the questions they are likely to face on the
Court. At the very least, the authors need to account for these differ
ences in determining the relevance of past votes to possible future
voting on the Court. Moreover, assessing justices' likely behavior
based on their votes as lower-court judges is dubious because lower
court judges are obliged to follow Supreme Court precedents justices
are free to question.58 Fifth, it is odd for the authors to rely on lower
court records of the facts of a case because these judges, too, might be
driven by their ideological preferences and thus their rendition of the
facts might not be neutral.
Beyond these problems, there are other difficulties with the attitu
dinal model's empirical support. First, the authors have yet to compile
empirical support for their claims about the constraining power of
sources other than precedent. Without such support, the authors risk
appearing hypercritical. The anecdotal evidence that they amass on
the indeterminacy of these other sources does not meet their exacting
standards.
Even worse for their model, the authors' data show there is
virtually no realm in which the justices' votes . perfectly track their
ideological preferences. Indeed, they repeatedly acknowledge
throughout their book that their data on the Court's practices and
decisions show that the attitudinal model largely explains outcomes.59
The concession reflects the authors' laudable preference for candor,
but it undercuts their insistence on the superiority of the attitudinal
model.
Second, the authors' research on whether justices follow prece
dents to which they dissented is dubious. There is no basis for believ
ing justices should follow precedents to which they dissented. The
same obligation that lower-court judges have to obey Supreme Court
precedent does not extend to the Court's dissenters; they are not
considered subordinate in any way to their colleagues and thus have
no obligation to accept their colleagues' positions. There is, in other
words, no norm that obligates justices to defer to precedents to which
they dissented.The legal model allows dissent.
Moreover, the label "preferentialist" used to describe the attitudes
of the justices who dissented to an original precedent60 is misleading.
The label suggests these justices reject precedents in favor of their
personal preferences and not on the basis of legal considerations. Yet,
58. Cf Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Supreme Court Precedents?,
46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994) (analyzing inter alia, the conventional arguments for lower
courts to follow Supreme Court precedents).
59. See, e.g. , pp. 76, 114, 176, 177, 290, 301-02, 3 11, 319, 350, 367, 378, 399, 404.
60. See pp. 296-97.
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there is no proof to support this supposition. In fact, the most common
explanation for the justices' failures to follow precedents to which they
dissented is their preference to follow other precedents.
Third, the authors insist implausibly that the Court is the most
important policymaker in our constitutional system.61 The Court
upholds rather than overturns policies in most cases. In these cases,
the policies that get implemented reflect the preferences of national
political leaders rather than those of the justices. If one were to
compile a list of the most significant statutes enacted by the Congress
over the past fifty years,62 it would not reflect any matter over which
the Court has exercised any meaningful influence.
Fourth, the authors set up an impossible standard to meet. The
authors admittedly predict only 77% of the Court's decisions (p. 319).
This is not a bad rate; it leaves, however, a substantial minority of
cases that the model promises to, but does not,· explain.
Fifth, the authors assume the only preference justices are inter
ested in maximizing is influence over policymaking. Justices, however,
have many interests they wish to maximize. Unfortunately, the authors
reject every one other than influencing policy because the others
cannot be objectively verified. A conventional assumption of
economics that individuals seek to maximize wealth is largely inappli
cable to federal judges whose salaries are fixed and tenure is secure.63
A justice cannot get a better salary by doing a better job as a justice.
She may, however, try to maximize other interests, including preserv
ing leisure time, desire for prestige, promoting the public interest,
avoiding having their decisions overturned; or enhancing reputation.
[P]ersonal dislike of a lawyer or litigant, gratitude to the appointing
authorities, desire for advancement, irritation with or even a desire to
undermine a judicial colleague or subordinate, willingness to trade votes,
desire to be on good terms with colleagues, not wanting to disagree with
people one likes or respects, fear for personal safety, fear of ridicule, re
luctance to offend one's spouse or close friends, and racial or class soli
darity64
may also represent interests Justices maximize. Additionally, justices
might seek to maximize their sense of duty, for example, trying to
make the best decision in light of the relevant legal materials. These
different interests suggest the possibility that the search for a single,
universal maximand is futile.

61. See p. 177 ("If a choice were to be made among President, Congress, and Court as to
which branch should rule, we continue to put our money on the justices.").
62.

l

attribute this test of the attitudinal model to Mark Graber, who suggested it to me.

63. See U.S. CONST. art. III. §

l.

64. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 130-31 ( 1995).
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Lastly, attitudinalists have conceded the relevance of "context," or
the facts of a given case, to a judicial decision.65 This concession effec
tively admits the relevance of precedent as a constraint on justices,
because the particular facts of a case are important for providing the
grounds on which justices distinguish or analogize between cases.
B.

The Problem of Constitutional Change

Constitutional change, in the short and long terms, poses serious
difficulties for the attitudinal model. First, the attitudinal model is
based in part on the presumption that individual justices have fixed
ideological preferences at the start of their respective tenures. Fixed
preferences ought to be relatively easy to measure. If they shift, how
ever, there would be no tangible measure of a justice's ideology
against which to assess her subsequent decisions. Unfortunately, there
are no data confirming that justices have fixed preferences at the out
set of their respective appointments. The search for these fixed prefer
ences often leads the authors around in circles.
This problem is evident in the authors' treatment of John Marshall.
They accept the misconception of Marshall as dominating his Court
intellectually to further the Federalist Party's policy preferences.66
They fail to acknowledge, much less appreciate, the fact that nearly all
of Marshall's constitutional opinions were delivered for a Court with a
hand-picked Jeffersonian majority on it. Most of the justices with
whom Marshall served were chosen because of their antipathy towards
Federalist policies and sympathy towards the Jeffersonian constitu
tional vision.67 Thus, the Court, with Marshall as Chief Justice, repudi
ated Federalist preferences that the Constitution be construed rigor
ously with any ambiguities in its language resolved according to the
"rule of choosing the meaning that best comported with the objects, or
purposes, of the Constitution as stated in the Preamble";68 that our
65. See p. 3 1 9 ("Facts obviously affect the decisions of the Supreme Court . . . . ).
66. See p. J 1 7 ("Unquestionably, John Marshall domi nated his Court as no other justice
has."). For the contrary viewpoint, see R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE
HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 4 13 (2001) (arguing that the unanimity achieved
during Marshall's tenure as Chief Justice was not so much a function of his superior intelli
gence as a reflection of his willingness to compromise):
"

By bending a little, Marshall preserved a lot. . .. [ I ] t was flexibility, along with tactical savvy
that permitted Marshall to salvage so much of his constitutional nationalism in an age hostile
to it. It's an unprovable counterfactual statement to say that Marshall's timely strategic re
treat foiled his enemies. but it's a good guess that it did.

For more critical analysis of misconceptions about Marshall, see Michael J. Gerhardt,
The Lives ofJohn Marshall, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399 (2002).

67. Republican appointees filled 10 of the 11 vacancies arising on the Court during Mar
shall's tenure.
68. William Winslow Crosskey, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in MR. JUSTICE 3 (Allison
Dunham & Philip B. Kurland eds., 1964).

May 2003)

Attitudes About Attitudes

1753

Constitution is not one of enumerated powers but rather invests the
Congress with "a general lawmaking authority for all the objects of the
government that the Preamble of the Constitution states";69 that the
"United States formed a single nation as to 'all commercial regula
tions' ";70 and that the common law was part of the law of the United
States and thus allowed for Supreme Court supremacy over the state
courts with respect to all questions of state law and common law.71 The
attitudinal model cannot explain why Marshall abdicated these
strongly held Federalist views as Chief Justice.
Moreover, some justices' attitudes seem to shift. The authors sug
gest Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter each became more "lib
eral" over time, while Justice White became more "conservative" over
time (p. 218). Similarly, the authors accept the conventional account
that in 1937 Owen Roberts and Charles Evans Hughes switched from
being "conservative" to joining the "liberals to uphold" the constitu
tional foundations of progressive economic regulations (p. 140). The
problem with these characterizations - even if they were true72 is that the attitudinal model cannot explain the shifts. If justices'
ideological preferences change, the model has to attribute the changes
to exogenous factors. Yet, the attitudinal model posits none for the
specific changes mentioned by the authors or the general phenomenon
of shifting judicial preferences.
Second, the attitudinal model is no more useful for explaining why
the ideological categories to which it assigns justices shift over time.
The authors gloss over shifts in the meanings of these categories,
merely defining them on the extent to which they favor or support
policies that are popularly viewed as liberal or conservative.73 If, how
ever, the meanings of these categories shift, the model cannot explain
why. The authors' categorization of ideologies cannot account for, and
is in fact undermined by, ideological drift, which is the phenomenon
by which a view generally associated with one political faction is over
time appropriated by or becomes associated with a different one.74
Thus, aggressive judicial review might in one period appear to be
liberal, while in another it might appear to be conservative. The fact
that such alterations occur is beyond doubt, even assuming particular
justices' attitudes are fixed.
69. Id. at 12.
70. Id. at 18.
71. The Court rejected this view in Wheaton v . Peters, 33 U .S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1 834).
72. For a contrary perspective, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE
(1993).
73. See p. 323.
74. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Rhetoric ofJudicial Critique: From Judicial Restraint to
the Virtual Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 637-38 (2002).
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Examining the public perceptions of John Marshall, Roger Taney,
and Felix Frankfurter provides some illumination. Marshall was
known throughout much of his career, particularly on the bench, as
overseeing a Court that became a "fortress of conservatism,"75 because
decisions he joined expanded national power at the expense of state
sovereignty and upheld private-property rights at the expense of social
and economic reform.76 Chief Justice Taney, on the other hand, exem
plified many liberals of his day, because of his respect for popular de
mocracy and states' governmental and social reforms.77 It is because of
ideological drift that contemporary liberals find something in common
with Marshall and not Taney.
In contrast, Frankfurter was the strongest advocate for j udicial
restraint during his twenty-two-year tenure on the Court. Praised by
liberals for his staunch defense of j udicial restraint in evaluating
progressive economic regulations through his first decade on the
Court, Frankfurter was upset to find that in the late 1940s and early
1950s liberals were denouncing him.
Now, when he advocated judicial restraint, he was attacked by those very
liberals [who had once praised him]. In his earlier years, pillars of the le
gal community like Henry Stimson, Emory Buckner, and Charles
Burlingham praised him. Now, they were either dead or silent . . . . [I]n
the Truman years, there was little White House contact. Frankfurter had
never believed he was "the single most influential man" in Washington
but sometimes he had enjoyed the notoriety. Now there was no more no
toriety; he was only one of nine, and one under increasing criticism from
those once his friends.78
In subsequent years, Frankfurter's status as a liberal has continued to
fade away.
Third, the attitudinal model cannot fully explain stability in consti
tutional doctrine. The authors insist that j ustices will not vote against
the interests of the governing political coalition, but the governing
political coalition sometimes does not get the change(s) it wants. The
authors ignore this fact in their political history of the Court, which is
filled with inexplicable periods in which new j ustices failed to alter
constitutional doctrine to the extent preferred by the political forces
75. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 322 ( 1946).
76. See CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 350 (1935) ("The popularity of John
Marshall . . . and the prestige acquired by the Supreme Court during his regime, resulted
largely from the fact that he wrote into constitutional law the beliefs and prejudices of a
class, the class, incidentally, from whose records and in terms of whose judgments most of
the history of the period has been written. Outside of that class he and his court were any
thing but popular. . . . ) .
"

77. See Carl Brent Swisher, Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in MR. JUSTICE, supra note 68, at
35.
78. LEONARD BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY 456
( 1984).
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responsible for their appointments.79 Indeed, there are many areas in
which judicial closure is achieved, in spite of the fact that many justices
might personally disagree with the position(s) reached.80 A striking re
cent example is Dickerson v. United States,81 the Court's seven to two
decision, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, reaffirming
Miranda v. Arizona82 in spite of a longstanding effort by Republicans
to dismantle Miranda.
Fourth, the attitudinal model does not address the phenomenon of
institutional path dependence. A decision has path dependency if it
compels or forces judges to forego or accept other choices.83 While
attitudinalists claim precedents do not generate any path dependency
in constitutional law,
[i]nstitutions are relatively persistent, and thus both carry forward in
time past political decisions and mediate the effects of new political deci
sions. The creation of institutions closes off options by making it more
costly to reverse course, by differentially distributing resources, and by
tying interests and identities to the status quo. [Moreover,] the persis
tence of institutions across time can foster political crises and change as
they enter radically changed social environments or abrade discordant
institutions.84
The attitudinal model does not address the link between constitutional
design and social or political change. As the next Part suggests, this
link is just one area in which the authors at the very least should do
further research to refine their model.
IV.

RETHINKING THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL

The attitudinal model is based in part on the presumption of a
coherent distinction between the external and internal perspectives of
the Supreme Court. There is, however, no such neat distinction. In the
real world of the law, judicial decisions are not made in a vacuum.
Justices operate not only with formal strictures (such as laws forbid79. See pp. 118-19, 130, 132-33, 135, 138, 153, 156, 159.
80. These decisions include incorporating most of the Bill of Rights into the Due Proc
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, upholding the constitutionality of legal tender,
upholding the constitutionality of congressional regulation of private economic activity, up
holding abortion rights for more than a decade, and upholding the constitutional founda
tions of the New Deal and the Great Society.
81 . 530 U .S. 428 (2000).
82. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
83. See Keith E. Whittington, Once More unto the Breach: PostBehavioralist Ap
proaches to Judicial Politics, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 601, 617 (2000) (reviewing SUPREME
COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell w. Clayton &
Howard Gillman eds., 1999); THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW
INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999))
(internal citations omitted).
84. Whittington, supra note 83, at 616.
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ding bribery), procedural requirements, and norms, but also within a
conceptual framework. Together, these elements constitute the special
institutional environment within which justices decide cases. In recent
years, legal scholars and political scientists have studied the specific
ways in which this environment shapes judicial decisions. Because
these studies support other models, they pose serious problems for the
attitudinal model. Attitudinalists have not yet addressed either these
problems or the implications of these studies for future research on
the Court.
A. Supreme Court Selection
In compiling data on Supreme Court selection, the authors
discount the strength of the relationship between justices' back
grounds and their attitudes. Other scholars have, however, drawn in
teresting conclusions about this relationship from simple bivariant
analyses. For instance, Richard Lazarus examined the correlation be
tween justices' votes in cases involving environmental law and their
love of the outdoors or personal involvement in activities that would
familiarize them with the importance of environmental protection
(such as hiking, hunting, and fishing).85 More recently, Tracey George
suggested that former academics show the greatest skepticism about
or willingness to question doctrine.86 Hence, she proposes that a presi
dent who wants to appoint a justice interested in challenging accepted
doctrine should consider leading academics as possible appointees. In
addition, Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, and Andrew Martin suggested
that over the past two decades prior judicial experience has become a
norm in Supreme Court selection.87 On their view, this norm has
evolved at the expense of greater diversity in the backgrounds and
experiences of the justices, which could improve the quality of the
Court's decisions.88 These studies should spur inquiries into why some
justices vote consistently with their backgrounds and others do not.
Discounting presidential selection criteria presents a bigger prob
lem for the authors. David Yalof's study of Supreme Court selection
shows presidents generally have very specific criteria in mind when
choosing Supreme Court nominees.89 This has been particularly true
85. Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in
the Supreme Court, 47 UC LA L. REV. 703 (2000).
86. Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9 (2001).
87. Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for
Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL . L. REV. 903 (2003).

88. This research is hardly without problems. For instance, Supreme Court selection is
rarely based on a single factor, such as background, while persons with backgrounds unlike
those on the Court might still share those justices' methodological commitments or attitudes.
89. DA YID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE
SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999).
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for Republican presidents over the past two decades. President
George W. Bush, who has not had the opportunity to nominate any
one to the Supreme Court, has chosen non-Supreme Court judicial
nominees thus far pursuant to careful ideological screening.90 While
each president's selection criteria might not explain senators' concep
tions of or reactions to particular nominations,91 they represent the
keenest insights on justices' likely ideology at the outset of their
respective tenures. Rather than look for a proxy for a justice's ideol
ogy based on presidents' and senators' attitudes, the authors should
consider testing a justice's votes against selection criteria. A correlat
ing pattern would support their model, while the absence of such a
pattern would require explanation.
B.

Postpositivists on Precedent

There is considerable postpositivist research that the authors do
not address. First, Gillman has summarized postpositivist research on
precedent that supports the legal rather than the attitudinal model.92
This research obliges the authors to explain why the techniques em
ployed in these studies are flawed (though they are common among
social scientists) or modify their conception of the legal model
accordingly.
Second, Keith Whittington has proposed research on "better inte
gration" of the different models of the Supreme Court.93 It would en
tail addressing the justices' sense of mission, the phenomenon of "Law
Talk"; "the extent to which judicial decision making is dependent on
prior cognitive maps that shape how the justices approach a given case
90. See, e.g., Kris Axtman, The Case ofJudges v. Ideology, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Boston), Jan. 23, 2003, at 2; Hans S. Nichols, White House Wishes, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS,
Jan. 6, 2003, at 1 8.
9 1 . Other research suggests that in times of divided government, institutional considera
tions (such as consulting with congressional leaders) have been more important in Supreme
Court selection than they have when the President's party controls the Senate. See, e.g. ,
Christine L. Nemacheck & Rachel P. Caulfield, Giving Advice: Congressional Lobbying in
Supreme Court Selection from 1930 to 1 992, Presentation to the Midwest Political Science
Association (Apr. 12, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). In the latter cir
cumstances, presidents have been relatively free to make choices based primarily on their
preferred criteria.
92. The authors fail to address, inter alia, recent research on "the use of precedent by
lawyers in case briefs and by justices in conference discussions, where discussion of legal ma
terials cannot be merely a matter of public relations"; "precedential effects on other [lower]
courts"; "judicial practices, such as writing concurring and dissenting opinions (forms of be
havior that are not about policymaking), inviting legislative overrides, and patterns of case
selection during the cert-granting process"; and "how distinctive jurisprudential categories
or doctrines have influenced voting and opinion writing on the Supreme Court." Gillman,
supra note 13, at 480-81 (internal citations omitted).
93. Whittington, supra note 83, at 632. For a similar approach to analyzing how the
court operates, see Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Su
preme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437 (2001).
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and imagine available choices"; "how the law maintains itself over
time"; and "the preconditions of legal change."94 He lauds other
scholars for demonstrating
the value of moving beyond vote counting and individual decisions and
examining the role that the Court plays in the American political system
as a whole. In doing so, they point to the interpenetration of law and
politics and the difficulty of regarding them as either separate spheres or
trying to collapse one category into another. Certainly work by interpre
tive institutionalists . . . [has] been deeply concerned with strategic ac
tion. Recent work by rational choice scholars similarly points the way
toward an integration of analysis of strategic judicial behavior and the
production and influence of the law.95
Whittington suggests institutional analysis provides a bridge between
"empirically minded political scientists interested in the law" such as
Spaeth and Segal and other scholars.96 He explains that "[t)he exami
nation of judicial decision making is already benefiting from efforts to
link the courts to other political and social actors and to situate the
judiciary within a nested set of discourses and social practices."97
Clarifying this link will elucidate "the many ways power is exercised
both inside the Court and out. "98
Third, the authors do not address Deborah Gruenfeld's work on
group dynamics within the Court. In one study, she examined the
"integrative complexity" of the justices in majority and minority
opinions, i.e., she studied the extent to which being in the majority or
dissent pressured the justices to expand their opinions to include some
discussion of opposing views.99 Her findings supported a "status
contingency model, which predicts higher levels of [integrative] com
plexity among members of majority factions [on the Court] than
among members of either minority factions or unanimous groups
independent[] of the ideological contents of their views."100 In another
study, she examined the extent to which a justice's status, in the
majority or dissent, shaped her integrative complexity in decisions to
uphold or overturn precedent. Gruenfeld and her coauthor found that
"justices writing on behalf of decisions to uphold precedent exhibited
greater integrative complexity than did justices writing on behalf of
decisions to overturn precedent, but this effect was stronger for the
·

·

94. Whittington, supra note 83, at 628.
95. Id. at 630-31 (internal citations omitted).
96. Id. at 631 .
97. Id. at 631 .
98. Id.
99. Deborah H. Gruenfeld, Status, Ideology, and Integrative Complexity on the U.S. Su
preme Court: Rethinking the Politics of Political Decision Making, 68 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 5 (1 995).

1 00. Id. at 5.
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authors of majority than minority opinions.''101 These findings support
the legal rather than the attitudinal model.
Fourth, Dean Revesz has shown that two other factors ignored or
discounted by rational-choice theorists influence outcomes, namely,
panel compositions (i.e., who sits with whom) and case selection (i.e.,
litigants' choices about which cases not to settle but rather to take all
the way up through the court system).1 02 These findings undermine the
attitudinal claim that ideology is the driving force of all judicial deci
sions.
.,

·

·

C.

Retesting the Legal Model

The new institutionalism suggests a middle position between atti
tudinalists' profinity for empirical analysis of legal influences and legal
scholars' skepticism of empirical testing of legal reasoning. Institution
alists examine the patterns and practices of the Court over time to
illuminate the constant or competing trends in its decisionmaking.
These patterns and practices support a synthetic rather than
unidimensional model of the Court. Below, I assess three different
ways in which these patterns oblige the authors (and others) to per
fect, or if necessary concede the limitations of, their model.
1.

Institutional Patterns

The attitudinal model can be tested further by researching several
patterns in the Court's decisions. First, one could determine how each
justice has prioritized major sources of constitutional meaning,
including text, structure, original intent, and precedent.103 Such
research would clarify whether these priorities hold true across differ
ent cases and the condition� under which they change. Second, no data
has been collected on the areas in which the Court has achieved
closure or stability. Third, researchers have yet to clarify the full range
of constitutional questions resolved by the political branches, includ
ing foreign affairs, impeachment, appointments, vetoes, and war
powers. Indeed, as this Review goes to press the Senate is divided over
101. Deborah H. Gruenfeld & Jared Preston, Upending the Status Quo: Cognitive Com
plexity in U.S. Suprem.e Court Justices Who Overtttrn Legal Precedent, 26 PERSONALITY &

Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1013, 1013 (2000).
102. See Revesz, supra note 50, at 175-77. Of course, one problem with this study is that
it merely measures how different panels have decided different cases. No single case is ever
decided by more than one court much less by multiple panels with different compositions.
103. See, e.g., Judicial Nominations, Filib11Sters, and the Constitution: When a Majority is
Denied Its Right to Consent: Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (special hearing on the constitutionality
of the filibuster); Michael Stokes Paulsen. The Many Faces of "Judicial Restraint," 1993 PUB.

L. REV. 3 (differentiating conservative justices based on their respective prioritizing of dif
ferent sources).
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one such issue: the constitutionality of the filibuster, particularly as
applied to judicial nominations. Hl4 Fourth, scholars should explore
whether some models explain some votes or decisions better than oth
ers.105 This research would clarify the utility of each model.
2.

The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent

The authors ignore how a precedent's form shapes its potential to
constrain. The justices' training and duties narrow their options for
packaging their decisions; they frame their judgments as rules or stan
dards. Rules and standards constrain judicial decisionmaking differ
ently, and these differences explain precedents' limited constraint on
the Court's decisions.
By design, rules constrain choices more than standards. 1 06 Rules
constitute broad, inflexible principles that provide clear notice to
those to whom they apply and that allow minimal discretion from
those charged with implementing them. A speed limit is a prime
example. It sets forth the maximum speed at which someone may
travel legally. Anyone who exceeds the limit violates the law. The law
allows no exceptions. The only discretion permitted by the law is
measuring the speed at which someone has been driving against the
maximum allowed to determine compliance.
The more absolutist the rule declared by the Supreme Court the
more strongly it imposes path dependency on the law. A good exam
ple is the rule that Justice Scalia proposes in racial-discrimination
cases.107 His rule would preclude almost all racial preferences. It
permits virtually no discretion for any lawmakers or justices. Such
constraint is the objective.
In contrast, standards set forth criteria against which governmental
action is measured. 1 08 Compliance entails discretion because a
standard's implementation requires a decisionmaker to interpret the

104. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 103 (differentiating conservative justices based on
their respective prioritizing of different sources).
1 05. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Pre
liminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003) (suggesting, inter alia, the possibility that
different models explain different justices' votes).
106. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 22
NOVA L. REV. 743, 751-53 (1 998).
1 07. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 ( 1 995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating categorically "government can
never have a 'compelling i nterest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up'
for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction ").
108. See Sullivan, supra note 106, at 753-58.
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criteria and to determine whether they · have been met. Standards
abound in constitutional law.109
To date, no one has collected data on standards and rules. The
Court's judgments can be categorized in terms of the numbers of rules
it has formulated; the breakdown of its rules into subject areas and in
terms of their relative clarity; the numbers of standards; and the
breakdown of standards into subject matter and clarity. These data
will clarify patterns in decisionmaking, including the areas in which the
Court frames its most restrictive judgments and those in which it
frames its least restrictive. The research will also clarify how many
clearly stated judgments have failed to constrain or lead to predictable
outcomes and how many resist categorization. For instance, David
Strauss has explained that Brown v. Board of Education110 did not
announce a clear principle of equal protection but rather can be read
as setting forth one of at least five different principles.111 Similarly,
in Griswold v. Connecticut,1 12 the majority announced at least four
theories supporting the outcome. Research on how many other deci
sions declare unclear or multiple rationales would illuminate the
precedents, claimed by Dworkin, allowing "weak" or "strong" discre
tion.113
3.

The Multiple Functions of Precedent

The authors' conception of precedent is so narrow that they ignore
other functions precedent performs in constitutional adjudication. The
attitudinal model cannot explain these functions, because they reflect
how precedent shapes legal reasoning, argumentation, and outcomes.
Identifying and tracking these functions should be easy. First,
precedents legitimize fundamental aspects of constitutional argumen
tation including sources of authority, interpretive methodologies, and
constitutional conceptions. Precedents serve as a testing ground for
each of these things, and how precedents deal with them shapes con
stitutional argumentation within, and beyond, the judicial process.
Second, precedents impose order on the legal system. They settle
109. Just a few examples include the balancing tests the· Court employs for determining
the reasonableness of searches or seizures, the propriety of some congressional encroach
ments on the powers of other branches, and the Court's varying levels of scrutiny for equal
protection disputes and free speech claims.
110. 347 U.S. 483 (1 954).
1 1 1. See David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 935 (1989).
1 12. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1 13. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31-33 (1978) (distinguishing
between an order that empowers individuals with broad latitude because it does not set forth
any criteria a decisionmaker has to satisfy, and orders that specify criteria, which allow deci
sionmakers to use their judgment within clear boundaries).
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di�putes, frame judicial and other agendas, and clarify what one needs
to do to prevail in constitutional adjudication. Third, precedents illu
minate and shape constitutional structure. They influence the relation
ship between the Court and other institutions. They serve as a unique
outlet for airing differences of opinion about constitutional matters,
take the heat off other branches by disposing of issues they would
prefer not to settle themselves, and shape the dialogue among the
branches about constitutional meaning. Fourth, precedents educate
the public, the legal community, and the world about the Court and
the Constitution. Precedent serves as a unique medium through which
others can view the Court and through which the Court views sources,
its own authority, and other branches' authority.1 14 Fifth, precedents
illuminate and shape constitutional history. Some precedents are so
closely intertwined with historical events that one cannot understand
the events or the precedents without understanding their relationship
- e.g., Dred Scott v. Sanford,115 the Civil War, and Reconstruction on
the one hand, and Bush v. Gore, the 2000 presidential election, and
George W. Bush's presidency on the other. Precedents also reflect the
attitudes of their respective historical periods,116 and constitute a
chronicle of constitutional history for the Court and others.117 Lastly,
precedents implement constitutional values, i.e., they translate certain
ideals into action.118 A single precedent can serve one or more of these
functions, all of which need to be measured for a comprehensive
understanding of what the Court does.
CONCLUSION

Though legal scholars will be tempted to reject the attitudinal
model as overly problematic, they should consider the following ques
tions: Would they defer to any Supreme Court nomination made by
any president? Would they approve any lower-court nominees in the
hopes they would defer to Supreme Court precedent? Most law
1 14. See, e.g. , Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term - Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 1 10 H ARV. L. REV. 6, 69-71 (1996) (describing the " expressive function"
of the Court as announcing the values and shaping popular understanding of the contents of
our common constitutional culture, which forms the core of the sense of political community
that comprises the United States).
1 1 5.

60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).

1 1 6. See, e.g. , Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1 029, 1 051(1990) (arguing that our judicial precedents and traditions have shaped our current atti
tudes and practices).
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1 1 7. Both the adversarial system and the justices' keeping an eye on each other·s opin
ions provide checks on the Court's mediations of past events by subjecting the Court's histo
riography to close scrutiny.
1 1 8. See, e.g. , CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 3
(2001 ) (suggesting judicial review, "like the Constitution, should be regarded as a practical
mechanism which implements a subtle form of democratic rule").
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professors would probably answer "no" · to both questions. These
answers concede the relevance of at least some legal attitudes to how
judges and justices will approach precedent, including how much they
ought to defer to it or how they would go about creating new prece
dent. Clarifying the extent of this relevance is a goal that law profes
sors share with Spaeth and Segal. Whether this goal can be achieved
depends on scholars' attitudes about the prospects for a common
methodology to explain the Supreme Court as comprehensively as
possible.

